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BOOK REVIEWS 
God, TIme, and Knowledge, by William Hasker. Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1989. Pp. xi and 209. $24.95. 
ALFRED J. FREDDOSO, University of Notre Dame. 
This outstanding book, which incorporates but goes beyond Hasker's exten-
sive previous work on the subject, is a genuinely pivotal contribution to the 
lively current debate over divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If you 
plan to plunge into this debate at any time in the foreseeable future, you will 
have to take account of God. Time, and Knowledge. 
Hasker's book has three commendable features worthy of immediate note. 
First, it contains a carefully crafted overview of the recent literature on 
foreknowledge and freedom and so can serve as an excellent introduction to 
that literature. Second, it is tightly reasoned and brimming with brisk argu-
ments, many of them highly original. Third, it correctly situates the philo-
sophical dispute over foreknowledge and freedom within its proper 
theological context and in so doing highlights the intimate connection be-
tween the doctrines of divine omniscience and divine providence. This is 
especially significant because much of the recent literature has been oblivious 
to the complications that arise once we take seriously the traditional theistic 
tenet that God, far from being a passive observer of the universe, is in fact 
its sovereign and provident governor. In short, a comprehensive account of 
freedom and foreknowledge must not only cohere with but also illuminate 
the notion of divine providence. 
Yet it is precisely here that God. TIme, and Knowledge is controversial and 
to my mind profoundly disturbing. For in opposition to every important 
classical Christian philosopher, Hasker denies in the end that God has infal-
lible knowledge of exactly how the contingent future will turn out. True, he 
is not the only distinguished contemporary Christian philosopher to have 
travelled this road; Richard Swinburne, John Lucas, and Peter Geach have 
preceded him. What's more, Hasker provides the most extensive argument 
I have seen for the claim that the denial of divine foreknowledge is fully 
consistent with Christian orthodoxy and, more specifically, with "an affir-
mative, constructive and (I believe) religiously satisfying conception of 
God's knowledge of the world and of his providential governance of the 
world" (p. 186). Only Geach's Providence and Evil is in the same class here. 
But Geach does not attempt an exhaustive refutation of the alternatives, as 
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Hasker does; nor does he argue in such detail for the 'risk-taking' account of 
divine providence. 
Still, I cannot hide my dismay. The likes of Justin Martyr, Tertullian, 
Origen, Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Luther, 
Calvin, Molina, Banez, Suarez, Arminius, Leibniz, and Edwards surely real-
ized that they could spare themselves a lot of philosophical grief if only they 
would repudiate divine foreknowledge and with it the traditional understand-
ing of divine providence, according to which every event that transpires in 
the universe, including every free action, is either knowingly intended or 
knowingly permitted by God prior to creation. Yet not one of these Christian 
intellectual heroes so much as entertained such a drastic expedient; to the 
contrary, the very thought of it would have appalled them. Were they less 
enlightened than we are about the Christian Faith as it pertains to providence 
and foreknowledge? Were they, as Hasker intimates (p. 191), the unwitting 
victims of an over-hellenized theology? (Even Luther and Calvin?!) It verily 
takes one's breath away to suppose so. Yet Hasker and his co-travellers 
apparently do suppose so. 
I will return to this matter below. First, however, I want to trace the line 
of reasoning by which Hasker reaches his novel conclusion. 
After cursorily surveying the historically important attempts to reconcile 
God's foreknowledge with human freedom (Chapter 1), Hasker devotes the 
bulk of the book (Chapters 2-9) to an extended argument for the thesis that 
no philosopher has ever succeeded in showing that God's putatively exact 
and infallible knowledge of future contingent is compatible with human free-
dom conceived of in a strongly libertarian way. 
He first (Chapter 2) attacks Molina's theory of middle knowledge, accord-
ing to which God's free knowledge of the actual (or absolute) contingent 
future results from His free act of will as guided by His antecedent natural 
knowledge of necessary truths and His antecedent middle knowledge of con-
ditional future contingents, i.e., propositions specifying, for any possible 
created agent A and complete set of circumstances C in which A is able to 
act indeterministically, how A would in fact act if placed in C. Hasker begins 
with Molinism because it is the only theory that promises to harmonize God's 
foreknowledge with strongly libertarian freedom in a way that preserves the 
traditional understanding of providence. 
I will not here rehearse or impugn Hasker's many objections to the theory 
of middle knowledge, in part because I have already had occasion to identify 
what I take to be problematic about his main line of criticism, and in part 
because this section of God, Time, and Knowledge has generated incisive 
rebuttals by Thomas Flint and Rod BertoleL I 
Having polished off Molinism, Hasker next (Chapter 3) argues that com-
prehensive simple foreknowledge (free knowledge in Molina's sense) is by 
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itself useless, since it comes too late in the order of explanation to guide 
God's choice of an all-embracing providential plan. Through His simple 
foreknowledge God knows what will in fact be effected by all the causal 
activity in the universe-including His own, since according to traditional 
Christian theology, every effect produced in the universe has God Himself 
among its immediate causes.2 Hence, His simple foreknowledge, unlike His 
natural knowledge and middle knowledge, is subsequent to His free act of 
will and thus cannot guide that act.3 So even before confronting the various 
'compatibilist' replies to the 'incompatibilist' thesis that there is a conflict 
between foreknowledge and libertarian freedom, Hasker takes himself to have 
undermined the main theoretical reason for affirming comprehensive simple 
foreknowledge in the first place, viz., the crucial role it supposedly plays in 
God's governance of the world. 
As I see it, this chapter constitutes an important advance which, along with 
recent defenses of middle knowledge, should create some intellectual discom-
fort for those many strong libertarians who affirm God's foreknowledge but 
reject middle knowledge. Hasker and the Molinists may occupy opposite ends 
of the foreknowledge/providence spectrum, but they are united in their dis-
dain for what they take to be the feeble positions in the middle. 
After carefully laying out the incompatibilist argument (Chapter 4), Hasker 
scrutinizes four compatibilist replies which attribute to God's infallible be-
liefs about absolute future contingents some sort of asymmetric dependence 
on what free agents will do, and which in this way try to subvert the in-
compatibilist assertion that because God's beliefs are themselves part of the 
fixed and 'accidentally necessary' past, they keep human actions from being 
free. 
This section begins (Chapter 5) with a critique of the Ockhamist contention 
that God's beliefs about future contingents, while part of the past, are not 
part of the accidentally necessary past-so that human agents even now have 
the power to determine just which propositions about their future free actions 
God has always and infallibly believed, and just which such propositions He 
has never believed. Ockhamists thus divide the past into (i) an accidentally 
necessary part composed of 'hard' facts, propositions which are not depen-
dent for their truth on what will happen in the future and which thus can no 
longer be made false, and (ii) a contingent part made up of 'soft' facts, 
propositions which are future-dependent and which even now can be (though 
they willllot be) made false by free agents. As the Ockhamists see it, God's 
past beliefs about future contingents are soft facts; and so even if God has 
always and infallibly believed that, say, Peter will refrain from watching the 
fifth game of the NBA Finals tonight, Peter still has the power to watch the 
game and with it the power to bring it about that God has never believed that 
he will refrain from watching it. 
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Hasker painstakingly examines the much-discussed though elusive distinc-
tion between hard and soft facts and concludes that on any plausible rendering 
of that distinction God's beliefs about the contingent future will, pace the 
Ockhamists, turn out to be hard facts and thus elements of the accidentally 
necessary past. I find Hasker's argument here unpersuasive, since it turns on 
a rather doubtful use of the notion of conceptual necessity. Still, I accept his 
conclusion, having come to believe on other grounds that the hard fact/soft 
fact distinction, though perhaps useful in specifying the causal prerequisites 
of free action, provides no warrant for denying that every truth about the past 
is accidentally necessary. 
Unlike Ockhamism, the other three compatibilist replies do not depend on 
partitioning the past into hard and soft facts. The second reply, propounded 
by George Mavrodes, is that, for all we know, none of the past is accidentally 
necessary, and so human agents may well have the power to prevent events 
that have already occurred from ever having occurred-including events that 
any version of the hard fact/soft fact distinction would count as paradigmatic 
hard facts. Hasker (Chapter 7) eschews the obvious (and, 1 believe, correct) 
rejoinder that this reply, even if coherent, is so wildly outlandish that only 
sheer desperation could prompt a compatibilist to adopt it. He responds in-
stead-more insidiously, as it turns out-that Mavrodes's proposal can be 
true only if we read the term 'power' in a weaker sense than that presupposed 
by the incompatibilist argument. To return to our example, assume that Peter 
retains his general causal ability to get up, walk over to his television set, 
tune it to the channel featuring the game, etc. Some might say that this is all 
the power he needs in order to be free to watch the game, even despite God's 
having believed from eternity that he will refrain from watching it. Not so, 
counters Hasker. God's past belief logically (though not causally) precludes 
Peter's exercising the relevant causal abilities in his concrete circumstances, 
and so Peter lacks the 'full-blooded' power to watch the game. Hence, when 
he refrains from watching it, he does not do so freely. (I will return to this 
in a moment.) 
The third compatibilist reply concedes that God's infallible beliefs about 
future contingents are part of the accidentally necessary past, but denies that 
they thereby deprive free agents of the power (in the sense required for 
freedom) to do otherwise. This reply, while not the exclusive property of 
Molinists, finds a natural home within the theory of middle knowledge. So 
assume for now that Molinism is true and that God believed from eternity, 
on the basis of His middle knowledge and free act of will, that Peter will 
refrain from watching the game tonight. And assume further, as we did above, 
that there are no causal barriers to Peter's watching the game, so that when 
he in fact refrains from watching it, he does not do so by natural necessity. 
Then, says the Molinist, despite God's past belief, Peter has the power (in 
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the sense required for freedom) to watch the game. However, pace Mavrodes 
and the Ockhamists, this is not to say that Peter has the power (Power A) to 
bring it about that God never had the belief in question; after all, God's having 
had that belief is now accidentally necessary. Rather, what Peter has is the 
power (Power B) to do something, viz., watch the game, such that if he had 
been going to do it in the relevant circumstances, then God would have known 
from eternity, via His middle knowledge, that Peter would freely watch the 
game if situated in those circumstances. Thus, God's middle knowledge and 
free knowledge, though not directly brought about by what Peter will freely 
do, are nonetheless 'counterfactually sensitive' to what he will freely do. So 
even though God's belief about Peter is now part of the fixed past, still, as 
long as the causal prerequisites for free action are satisfied, Peter has the 
power to watch the game; therefore, when he in fact refrains from watching 
it, he does so freely. And the theory of middle knowledge provides a meta-
physical model on which all these claims come out true. 
Hasker replies in Chapter 6 by invoking an "unassailable" (p. 114) power 
entailment principle according to which Peter's having Power B entails his 
also having the admittedly objectionable Power A. Thomas Flint has shown 
that this power entailment principle, far from being indisputable, cannot even 
be reasonably assessed until we know more precisely what the slippery locu-
tion 'bring about' means as it occurs in the principle.4 However, here I want 
to take a different tack by displaying how intimately Hasker's use of the 
principle in Chapter 6 is connected with his later appeal to logical preclusion 
in Chapter 7. 
The 'logical preclusion' argument goes roughly as follows: "Because God's 
infallible belief is part of the accidentally necessary past, it is an uneliminable 
circumstance of Peter's action. What's more, that belief is incompatible with, 
and thus logically precludes, Peter's watching the game. But if an unelimin-
able circumstance logically precludes an agent's performing a given action, 
then the agent lacks the power (in the sense required for freedom) to perform 
that action; for having the power to perform the action would entail having 
the power to eliminate an uneliminable circumstance. Hence, Peter lacks the 
power to watch the game; and so when he refrains from watching it, he does 
not do so freely." 
Hasker's power entailment principle merely serves to codify this argument. 
But how are we to evaluate the argument? Consider another example adduced 
by Hasker: Thomas wants to marry Edwina but is logically precluded from 
doing so by the fact that she is already married and that, given the laws 
governing the institution of marriage, it is impossible for anyone to be mar-
ried to more than one person at the same time; hence, Thomas lacks the power 
(in the sense required for freedom) to marry Edwina. 
Now ask yourself just which of his basic causal powers Thomas is pre-
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c1uded from exercising solely by virtue of the fact that Edwina is already 
married. The correct answer, I think, is: "None at all." Thomas can (if he is 
willing to lie) secure a marriage license, appear with Edwina before a duly 
designated official, profess the marriage vows, and, in general, carryon 
exactly as if there were no legal impediment to the marriage. To be sure, the 
law renders him unable to marry Edwina. However, this 'inability' is due not 
to a lack of causal power on Thomas's part, but to the absence of a legal 
circumstance, viz., Edwina's being unmarried, that is required in order for his 
exercise of the relevant causal powers to count as his marrying Edwina. The 
question now becomes: Is there an analogous 'inability' in the case of Peter? 
And the answer, it seems to me, is that there is not. For, as in the case of 
Thomas, Hasker is willing to admit that Peter retains all the basic causal 
capacities required for his watching the game, and that all the external causal 
prerequisites (a properly functioning television set, a sufficient supply of 
electricity, etc.) are satisfied. Yet in Peter's case there is no obvious analogue 
of the legal constraints that were operative in the case of Thomas and Edwina. 
Given that Peter is fully capable of moving his body in the ways appropriate 
for watching the game and that none of the external causal prerequisites is 
absent, there seems to be nothing that would keep his exercise of the relevant 
causal powers from counting as his watching the game. In brief, it is ex-
tremely difficult to see how the 'circumstance' of God's past belief could 
play in this case a role corresponding to that played in the other case by the 
circumstance of Edwina's already being married. 
In the case of Thomas and Edwina, then, we have a clear picture of how 
logical preclusion figures in Thomas's inability to marry Edwina, as well as 
a clear understanding of the nature of that inability; Thomas can exercise his 
basic causal powers all right, but his doing so will still not count as his 
marrying Edwina. By contrast, in Peter's case we have no such clarity at all. 
Hasker seems to suggest that even though Peter, like Thomas, retains the 
relevant causal powers, he, unlike Thomas, is not able to exercise them-and 
this because of God's past foreknowledge. But how is this supposed to work, 
exactly? Does God's foreknowledge somehow insinuate itself into the causal 
order to literally prevent Peter from exercising his power to watch the game? 
No, since as Hasker emphasizes, his own incompatibilist argument "in no 
way depends on the assumption that God's belief causes human actions" (p. 
141). Well, then, just how does it work? 
These considerations explain why I am unimpressed by Hasker's charge 
that "the central idea of the Molinist position, as explicated by Freddoso, 
seems to be that any determinism that results from divine foreknowledge is 
not a 'serious' determinism, because it is not causal" (p. 141). True enough, 
but only because I do not have even a faint idea of how logical preclusion 
by divine foreknowledge-as opposed to, say, logical preclusion by legal 
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statute-is supposed to result in an agent's inability to do something. Nor am 
I swayed by Hasker's accusation that "a compatibilist such as Molina or 
Freddoso is claiming that Peter can have the power to [watch the game], even 
though it is logically impossible that he should exercise that power under the 
existing circumstances" (p. 141). I admit, of course, that there is no possible 
world in which God believed from eternity that Peter will not watch the game 
and in which Peter watches the game nonetheless. No surprise there. But I 
deny that there is any more interesting sense in which it is impossible for 
Peter to exercise his power to watch the game. More precisely, Peter's exer-
cising the basic powers required to watch the game is fully compossible with 
all the other causal activity, including God's, that has ever occurred in the 
past or is anywhere occurring in the present. This is as much as any strong 
libertarian could possibly hope for. So even while conceding that the notion 
of a basic causal power needs further analysis,S I find Hasker's complaints 
entirely unmoving. 
The fourth compatibilist reply is the so-called 'eternaIist solution,' accord-
ing to which God's knowledge of future contingents is not part of the past at 
all, but is instead located in the presentness of God's eternity, which admits 
of no past or future. Thus, God's beliefs about future contingents have no 
necessity of a sort that rules out human freedom. In reply, Hasker argues that 
even though the doctrine of God's eternaIity is intelligible (Chapter 8) and 
perhaps even sufficient to defuse the incompatibilist argument as it stands 
(Chapter 9), it does not by itself provide a sufficient foundation for the 
traditional understanding of divine providence. Interestingly, this is the same 
conclusion Molina had reached in Disputation 49 of Part IV of his Concordia. 
And I must confess that it seems right to me, too. 
This brings us at last to Hasker's defense of the 'risk-taking' (or, as I prefer 
to call it, the 'damage control') account of divine providence (Chapter 10). 
Hasker realizes that he is on shaky ground here. A sure sign of this is that he 
becomes exceedingly, though rather delightfully, tendentious. So allow me to 
reply in kind. 
On the risk-taking account of providence, God lacks exact and infallible 
knowledge of the contingent future. Yet given His thorough familiarity with 
present causal tendencies and His clear grasp of His own providential designs, 
He is almost sure about how the future will tum out. In fact, He is even pretty 
sure about whether or not we human beings (including, presumably, Jesus 
Christ) will do freely what He intends us to do; but He is strong enough to 
make us do it anyway, if it suits Him. As Hasker puts it, "God is perfectly 
capable of making someone an 'offer he can't refuse'" (p. 196). So even if 
the world begins to go really badly, God, though disappointed, is fully capable 
of controlling the damage. What's more, His prophecies about future free 
actions-including sinful ones, such as Peter's denial of Christ-are almost 
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sure to be fulfilled; and, once again, even if the improbable happens and God 
turns out to have been mistaken in so prophesying, He is powerful enough to 
put things back on track. Likewise, even allowing that some of His ends (e.g., 
the triumph of grace over sin) depend crucially on specific free actions being 
performed by specific human beings (e.g., Abraham, Moses, Jeremiah, Mary 
the Mother of God, Peter, Paul, etc.), He can be almost sure, given His 
unusually high degree of knowledge and power, that those ends will be 
realized. And if all this strikes you as excessively anthropomorphic and as 
coming dangerously close to turning God the Father into the Godfather, then 
according to Hasker you have not been sufficiently dehellenized. 
Not content simply to promote his own watered-down account of provi-
dence, Hasker heaps scorn upon the traditional account, according to which 
"our most ennobling achievements are just the expected printouts from the 
divine programming" (p. 199). In his zeal, he even resorts to the "Hitler" 
defense. (One can imagine a medieval Hasker conjuring up the "Genghis 
Khan" defense.) After running roughshod over hundreds of pages of the best 
scholastic theology by declaring ex cathedra that those who adhere to the 
traditional account cannot distinguish what God intends from what He merely 
permits, Hasker concludes that they "cannot avoid saying ... that God specif-
ically chose Hitler to become leader of the Third Reich and instigator of the 
Holocaust" (pp. 199-200). Really now. More to the point, ask yourself 
whether Hasker's risk-taking account fares any better with regard to Hitler. 
Once Hitler accedes to power and gets the Holocaust rolling on its grisly way, 
even the risk-taking God, who is after all pretty knowledgeable, should have 
a crystal-clear idea of the further specific evils that are almost certain to 
occur. So if He does not intervene early on to stop Hitler, this can only be 
because of some worthy (though very hidden) purposes He has in mind. In 
that case, would it not be just as true on the risk-taking account as on the 
traditional account that "God has deliberately and with full knowledge chosen 
that these good purposes shall be fulfiLLed through a plan that entails the 
actual occurrence (not just the possibility) of specific evils" (p. 200)? Let's 
face it. Hitler is a problem for everyone. 
Finally, after implicitly saddling the traditionalist with Eleonore Stump's in-
credibly strong suggestion that the sufferings of each human person are out-
weighed by a greater good which those very sufferings produce for that same 
person, Hasker endorses Michael Peterson's more congenial 'risk-taking' theod-
icy, according to which a world created by God might be literally teeming with 
genuinely gratuitous evils. I would have thought-with, say, Aquinas-that the 
most plausible theodicies lie somewhere between Stump's and Peterson's. 
I am not convinced, then, by Hasker's closing proclamation that 
"[Peterson's] theodicy, and the understanding of divine providence which it 
involves, are clearly acceptable as judged by the canons of orthodox, main-
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stream Christian theology" (p. 205). In a word, even if, contrary to what I have 
urged, Hasker's arguments for incompatibilism were indeed compelling, it would 
still be incumbent upon Christian philosophers to preserve the classical under-
standing of divine providence, which is a linchpin of the Christian Faith and of 
the traditions of intellectual inquiry it has inspired. As I see it, this is the main 
theological lesson to be learned from Hasker's remarkably provocative book. 
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WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College. 
Christian Philosophy comprises seven papers delivered at a 1988 conference 
at Notre Dame, plus an excellent introduction by Thomas Flint. I shall com-
ment on each of the essays in turn. 
